PS: This quotation from Thomas Szasz summarizes one way of regarding the curse of psychiatric diagnoses: From Thomas Szasz, Psychiatry: The Science of Lies (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008), pages 2-3 (italics in original). Objective (biological, chemical, physical) tests for diseases are based on the assumption that diseases are somatic phenomena. Accordingly, the claim that mental illnesses are brain diseases is profoundly self-contradictory: a disease of the brain is a brain disease, not a mental disease. Because there are no objective methods for detecting the presence or establishing the absence of mental diseases, and because psychiatric diagnoses are stigmatizing labels with the potential for causing far-reaching personal injury to the stigmatized person, the “mental patient’s” inability to prove his “psychiatric innocence” makes psychiatry one of the greatest dangers to liberty and responsibility in the modern world. The legal system recognizes the elementary distinction between innocence and guilt. The psychiatric system does not: it proudly rejects the concept of personal responsibility. Crime is a well-defined act. Mental illness is an ill-defined mental state. Criminal prosecution is defined, and popularly understood, as adversarial. Psychiatric treatment, even when forcibly imposed by law, is defined and widely accepted as nonadversarial. Those differences, together with the notion of mental illness, are the two great lies and injustices that undergird the psychiatric enterprise. It is possible to establish that a person accused of a crime is not guilty, that is, has not performed the illegal act attributed to him and is the victim of malicious prosecution serving, say, the personal-political ambitions of an unscrupulous district attorney; it is also possible to punish the person responsible for such malicious prosecution. In contrast, it is impossible to establish that a person diagnosed as mentally ill is not mentally ill and is the victim of malicious psychiatrization serving, say, the economic-ideological ambitions of the diagnostician; it is not possible to punish the person responsible for the injurious diagnosis that may be erroneous but, by definition, cannot be malicious. In the Anglo-American adversarial legal system, the accused is presumed innocent until proven otherwise, and the onus of proof of guilt is on the accuser. In the psychiatric-inquisitorial “medical” system, this relationship is reversed: the person diagnosed as mentally ill is presumed insane until proven otherwise, and the onus of disproof of insanity is on the (usually powerless) individual incriminated as “insane.” A priori, psychiatrists disqualify such claims of “psychiatric innocence” as evidence of the “insane patient’s” denial of his illness.