An independent review commissioned in the UK to address escalating demand for ADHD and autism diagnosis and treatment has missed an important opportunity to correct misleading notions about the meaning of psychiatric diagnosis and the nature and effectiveness of stimulant treatment.
The Independent Review into Prevalence and Support for Mental Health Conditions, ADHD and Autism, led by Peter Fonagy, was published in mid-October.
It was commissioned to look at the causes of the rising demand for assessments for ADHD and autism, sometimes referred to as neurodiversity, and to help people get the “right support”. The truth is, the UK’s National Health Service is buckling under the weight of this demand. Many adult mental health teams have had to stop accepting these referrals in order to continue to function. This means people are redirected to private providers at public expense. The report highlights how the NHS is overspending on these assessments by £164 million per year and the Centre for Health and the Public Interest describes the costs of this provision as “accelerating at an almost exponential rate”.
There are some good points in the Independent Review. It raises fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of diagnosis in mental health and it makes some sensible suggestions about how help and support can be organised around people’s needs without the need for diagnosis.
The executive summary recommends: “There should be a fundamental shift from a ‘diagnosis-dependent’ system to a ‘needs-led plus diagnosis’ system.” And later: “The problem is a system that leans too heavily on diagnosis as the route to help and cannot keep pace”.

The review also highlights how the private sector is cashing in on the public demand for diagnosis at the cost of millions of pounds of public money with no real oversight or accountability. And it stresses that mental health problems are influenced by social and economic conditions and that tackling these and particularly addressing the barriers to participation in school, work and community are key to improving mental health.
However, the Review is also riddled with contradictions and confusion and nothing it suggests is likely to make any difference to the current situation. Ironically, given that rising pressure on the NHS budget was one of the drivers of the Review, if its recommendations are implemented, which is doubtful, they will cost the taxpayer more, not less. It’s difficult not to conclude that the Review was really an exercise in being seen to do something, rather than an effort to bring about significant change.
One of the main problems is that the Review accepts the definition of autism and ADHD as “neurodevelopmental conditions”. It defines these as conditions that are “strongly genetically influenced and present from early life” in the Executive Summary, and elsewhere as “differences in how the brain and nervous system develop that are present from early life, although not always apparent immediately and shape enduring patterns of cognition, attention, communication, behaviour and learning”.
However, as James Barnes has pointed out, the Review simultaneously endorses two contradictory conceptions of diagnosis. Alongside the idea that diagnosis identifies a neurological condition, it acknowledges that “diagnosis is based on categories of symptoms rather than established biological mechanisms” and on judgements about their “severity, persistence and impact on functioning”. Therefore, the diagnosis does not represent a neurodevelopmental disorder. Calling it one simply assumes that symptoms or difficulties that reach a certain threshold must represent a neurological dysfunction or difference.
This assumption is not supported by evidence. Brain imaging studies show that people with an ADHD diagnosis are more likely to show slightly reduced volume in some small areas but there is little consistency between studies in which areas are identified and none have adequately controlled for important confounders such as IQ, birth trauma and socio-economic status that are known to be associated with brain volume and having an ADHD diagnosis. The large ENIGMA study, for example, found minuscule differences in some areas of the basal ganglia which have not been confirmed in subsequent research. The lead investigator, who at the time of publication hailed the findings as showing that “ADHD is a disorder of the brain”, later admitted that “Back then, we emphasized the differences that we found (although small), but you can also conclude that the subcortical and cortical volumes of people with A.D.H.D. and those without A.D.H.D. are almost identical”.
There is even less consistency in autism research.
Functional imaging also shows weak and inconsistent findings and, in any case, functional imaging can’t identify causes of a condition since it only reflects how the brain is functioning in the moment it is performed.
Authors of a 2022 review of imaging research in ADHD concluded that “Consensus is lacking regarding altered anatomic or functional imaging findings of the brain in children with ADHD, likely because of the heterogeneity of the disorder,” and that “no definitive structural or functional pattern defines the disorder from a neuroradiologic perspective”.
Genetic studies identify several genes that slightly increase the risk of being diagnosed with ADHD later in life, but there is considerable overlap with genes associated with other mental disorders, including depression, insomnia and obesity, smoking and IQ and the genes identified are not related to any suggested biological mechanism of ADHD. Moreover, almost any behavioural trait you can think of has been shown to have some genetic associations when these have been explored, including religious observance and going to the pub!
No other body of research has provided consistent findings of differences between people with ADHD and autism and those without, including research on brain chemicals such as dopamine.
Therefore, although a subgroup of people diagnosed with autism who have significant intellectual disability might be thought of as having a neurological condition, it is misleading to refer to ADHD and autism, in general, as neurodevelopmental conditions. This does not reflect the evidence base.
The diagnosis of autism and ADHD are based on the same circular logic as other psychiatric diagnoses. We decide that a certain set of problems should be called X. If you experience these problems, we say you “have X”. X is then regarded as an explanation for your problems, in the same way that having lung cancer would be an explanation for having a cough. But X is not an explanation of this sort at all. It is just a name—more like saying “coughing disorder” is the reason for your cough.
As soon as a label is applied, you no longer know what problems the individual is actually struggling with. And the problems that are being incorporated under the neurodiversity umbrella are expanding all the time. They now include common experiences such as justice sensitivity and rejection sensitivity. In fact, the manifestations of neurodiversity are so varied that, as Stephen Shore suggests, “If you’ve met one person with autism, you’ve met one person with autism.” But if it is this diverse, the label has become empty.
Adding the criteria that there has to be significant impairment doesn’t change the situation. Impairment just becomes part of the circular logic. You get the diagnosis when you are impaired, and the diagnosis, in turn, means you are impaired. The diagnosis still fails to add any useful information.
Moreover, deciding how impairing or impactful something is highly subjective and this is why the diagnosis has become so elastic. Someone might argue that finding it difficult to concentrate in boring meetings is “impairment” and that this should qualify them for a diagnosis. They might think they struggle to concentrate more than other people do, but how can anyone know this, when most people would say they find it difficult? We might think that significant impairment is when someone is threatened with losing their job because they can’t concentrate, but a prospective patient might counter that although they are not performing badly in their job, they could be doing better. They might say they should be in line for a promotion but can’t get it because of their difficulties. Is this “impairment”?
So adding impairment into the diagnostic criteria does not make them any more objective or likely to identify an underlying brain mechanism. Diagnosis does not resolve the complex question of which needs deserve publicly-funded medical support and which don’t.
The Independent Review also recognises that diagnosis is not necessary for identifying someone’s problems and providing appropriate support. “Diagnosis and support needs are not the same” it says, and goes on, “people may require support without meeting diagnostic thresholds, while people with the same diagnosis may require very different kinds of help”.
It also devotes space to the important question of how to assess people’s needs in a fair and consistent manner, recognising that this is not a medical prerogative, but a process that is undertaken across health, social care and welfare services that could be better integrated.
Yet, the Review also repeatedly reinforces the validity and importance of diagnosis. The summary says: “For many people it [diagnosis] is clinically necessary, personally meaningful and essential to treatment. It can help explain and address difficulties that significantly impair a person’s functioning, participation and quality of life”.
The main report of the Review suggests “the Review does not propose changing the role of diagnosis in determining access to NHS treatments or other services that depend upon it” and stresses that “far from reducing the importance of diagnosis, the Review places greater emphasis on accurate assessment of co-occurrence and differential diagnosis, undertaken in accordance with NICE guidance and established classification systems”.
The Review calls for investment in “neighbourhood teams” or community services that can provide therapeutic support while people wait for a diagnostic assessment, and suggests that in some cases this will avoid the need for diagnosis, but other than this it doesn’t propose any fundamental changes to the current system.
It suggests that current waiting lists for ADHD and ASD assessments and services are scrutinised by senior clinicians to determine the “primary presenting concern” and to determine the “most relevant existing pathway”. It seems to anticipate the process will lead to people being removed from these waiting lists because it says “People must not just be removed from waiting lists without a proper assessment and need appropriate communication, discussion to ensure they receive a response as early as possible that responds to their needs and the right to a clearly defined and transparent appeals process”. But the reason there is a waiting list is that staff don’t have the time to do “a proper assessment”.
Most adults who seek an assessment want a diagnosis, and are unlikely to be deterred by being offered non-specific support. Many want to try stimulant treatment. There are various reasons why people might seek a diagnosis, but many are “searching for understanding and identity” and have been led to think, as the report reinforces in various places, that the diagnosis will explain their problems.
This is a complete misunderstanding and the Review had an opportunity to correct it. The Review could have explained that the diagnosis is not an explanation, but simply a way of describing or naming particular sorts of problems. It had the opportunity to inform people that there is no proof that autism (as the term is currently used) and ADHD are caused by different or dysfunctional brains and that they are not correctly thought of as “neurodevelopmental disorders”. This might have started to damp down the demand for the diagnosis and the expectations that are placed on it—expectations that are unlikely to be fulfilled by any interventions the diagnosis can unlock.
The Review says almost nothing about stimulant treatment for ADHD, for example, even though this is a major incentive for people coming to services and underpins the perceived need for diagnosis. It is commonly believed that stimulants treat ADHD symptoms by targeting an underlying biological mechanism, but this has not been demonstrated. It is contradicted by the fact that stimulants improve concentration and attention in people with and without ADHD diagnoses and in animals as a consequence of their well-recognised effect of increasing wakefulness and alertness.
So stimulant treatment need not depend on having a diagnosis. It could simply be prescribed to people who are having extreme difficulties with concentration and attention. The important question is are stimulant effects really useful and if so, do these useful effects outweigh their disadvantages and health hazards?
Randomised controlled trials find that people taking a stimulant have fewer symptoms of ADHD compared to people taking a placebo, but these trials have significant limitations which make their results unreliable. The main one is that stimulants make people feel more confident, so they think they are performing better than they actually are. Yet the trials typically don’t rate people’s performance in objective ways—they just use rating scales that ask people if they think their concentration or distractibility has improved. Stimulants help people to spend more time on a particular task, but have not been convincingly shown to improve learning, exam performance or academic achievement, work productivity, driving ability or any other area.
Stimulants are not sugar pills. They are powerful drugs that significantly alter one’s physical and mental state. Long-term use is associated with an increased risk of cardiovascular effects such as stroke and heart failure, and neurological effects, including tics and an increased risk of Parkinson’s-like neurological disease. They can cause irritability, anxiety, mood swings, emotional numbness, social withdrawal, obsessional behaviour and can lead to psychosis.
For most people, the slim and unproven chance of getting any objective benefit from taking stimulants will not outweigh the risks to their physical and mental health.
I know the Review did not have the remit to question treatment guidelines, but this needs to be done to address the current situation. People will not be discouraged from seeking a diagnosis as long as it is linked to a treatment that is presented as effective and specific. We need to curtail stimulant use because this latest prescription drug epidemic will result in an increase in the prevalence of major medical conditions including cardiovascular disorders and Parkinson’s disease in the not-too-distant future.
The recommendation to allocate support based on needs rather than diagnosis could have been radical. As the Review points out, mental health services do partially operate in this way, but they do so within a medical framework that suggests that people “have” medical conditions that need medical treatments. This sets expectations and mandates following drug-focused treatment protocols. The Review could have helped changed this framework by following through on its insight that diagnosis does not align with need.
If it had done this, we might have been able to start a conversation about how to provide help to people who are struggling with aspects of life without having to label them as sick and without giving them the misleading and potentially life-limiting message that the problems are in their brain.













I found one term here with which I was unfamiliar: “justice sensitivity.”
Upon checking its definition I learned that it denotes an overreaction to injustice or unfairness and is hypothesized to be a trait of some individuals diagnosed with an autism spectrum disorder. A co-morbid trait is so-called hyperempathy, i.e. excessive interest in and concern about other people’s painful experiences and suffering..
I suspect I may have this particular syndrome, given my continual hostility to psychiatry’s deceptive misuse of medicalized language, its sordid record of collusion with oppressive political systems and fraudulent pharmaceutical companies, and of course its many well-documented harmful practices, such as the unjustified mass drugging of schoolchildren with potent neurotoxins.
Does my intense emotional response to these matters make me a candidate for psychotherapy?
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Wow, so being TOO empathetic and TOO concerned with justice is now a mental problem? I guess I’m pretty messed up then. Exactly HOW much justice are we supposed to be satisfied with? And when should we be learning to be less concerned about others feelings? Is there now an optimum level of selfishness to which we should aspire?
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Is there an “optimum” level of selfishness to which we should aspire?
Elon Musk once famously said that “empathy is a weakness.” He, Ayn Rand, Jeffrey Epstein, and similar notorious sociopaths and narcissists provide a template.
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Empathy – cognitive empathy is used as a tool for manipulation, is it not?
The heart-felt and compassionate kind of empathy only exists in some rare individuals, and some rare families. It may or may not extend any further.
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Yes. Come and live in my neighbourhood. The me me me hood, where not a single person gives a damn about anyone, anybody unless there is some financial gain to them alone. They gossip and complain and even threaten others, but flatly refuse to offer needed support even in a crisis moment. No cuppa. No chat. Will call emergency ambulance maybe.
When the individual has a healthy source of money supply – earned, family, inheritance, there is no other aspect to life. The “family” networking is about money and ensuring that inheritance.
Why would people in medicine et cetera be any different?
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The review does not seem to address the spectrum of ADHD and or Autism.
School children and preschool children garner funds and funding for schools, and financial gains for the parent/s. Accommodations rarely assist the actual child. But money talks.
How many psych-med-fuelled injustices are perpetrated? The rages, the hostilities, the violence, the aggressions post ingestion of neuro-toxic drugs. Research, phaRMa, governments et al, continue to refuse to acknowledge a direct causal relationship.
“If it had done this, we might have been able to start a conversation about how to provide help to people who are struggling with aspects of life without having to label them as sick and without giving them the misleading and potentially life-limiting message that the problems are in their brain.”
WHY would the Review address people’s needs in ways that will not make substantial amounts of money?
Addressing people’s needs, let alone in real time would require massive amounts of resources that equate to money going out with no ROI in the immediate or short term. No actuarial projections on investments.
Adult diagnosis especially when attending in tertiary education settings, garner accommodations and privileges for the student/s.
Any Review, it could be a given, that money generated is the key and primary focus, regardless of other more sensible and humane alternatives.
To be seen to be doing something is exactly what is wanted. The Reviewers are paid handsomely, the outcomes are predetermined via Terms of Reference or the like.
Cardiology specialist and vascular specialist are not going to stop promising sources of income. Neither will Parkinson’s Foundations and other organisations and treatment providers. Parkinson’s-like (drug induced) findings now come under the Parkinson’s umbrella, which leads to more funds, funding, grants, research opportunities, jobs and even the building of new facilities and centres. How exciting.
Those drug “induced” QT prolongations, those chest pains, the palpitations, the dizziness, shortness of breath – these specialists are thriving. Imaging diagnostics are thriving.
Why would a Review disrupt higher-end incomes and earnings?!
When those kiddies become unwell they can look forward to cascade prescribing, NEW diagnoses by specialists, and a brain and body riddled with cellular changes that will be labelled as genetic of some type or another. SCIENCE per se, will make it all fit.
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And so it will continue without a proletarian movement for socialism.
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Thank you Professor Moncrieff for a much needed, scientific, impartial and objective review of
a situation where diagnostic credibility is increasingly questioned.
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“When you’re rich enough, you’re eccentric; when you’re poor, you’re crazy!” seems to apply to the poor old NHS now, too.
Perhaps it could try talking to God – but, of course, not reveal the fact if God talks back to it?
If only I can manage to get myself so far towards the right end of the autistic and ADHD spectra that I am functioning socially at my optimum – and I expect I will know this if every human I encounter immediately bursts out laughing and falls head-over-heels in love with me and every domestic or wild animal approaches closer to be petted – then, presumably, I will also be up there at the right end of all the other spectra, too?
You know, the anxiety, the depression, the OCD, the paranoid schizophrenia et cetera spectra?
But I wouldn’t want to bet I’d be safe from diagnoses of mania, then, either, like all those female Catholic saints who risked the wrath of Inquisitions…and those, like another Joanna, Joan of Arc, who risked and incurred that wrath…and was burned at the stake on May 30th, 1431 before being canonized on May 16th, 1920.
Oh, dear, what’s a poor boy – or NHS – gonna do, Joanna become enlightened, and save the worlds from Sin?
Thank you for all the scholarship!
Comfort and joy!
Tom.
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In defence of both Joanna and the NHS, I suspect they are both just procrastinating long enough, like all the administrative administrations, for us human beings to ripen enough to understand that that they have all been trying to teach us what all of us having unwittingly and mostly witlessly being trying to teach one another:
Not only is every open-mike stand-up joke true – by virtue of being fully human we are indeed fully animal – but, just as every Earthling is a Cosmosling, so, too, are we fully divine, the very goddesses and God’s watching our own drama from…the gods.
https://youtu.be/bB8AIRvqvEw?feature=shared
The gods (theatrical) – Wikipedia https://share.google/6gBbtYYXBc4YQQL19
God rest ye merry.
Tom.
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Having finally figured out the answer to What was the joke (that his “Lord” told Meister l-{“My Lord told me a joke. And seeing Him laugh has done more for me than any scripture I will ever read”}-Eckhart (that his “Lord” would not only save him – JUST – from the Holy Inquisition, but that he could reincarnate as he pleased as Dolly Parton, Taylor Swift, Diane Morgan, Judy Tenuta, Joanna Moncrieff and/or Clint Eastwood, obviously), I naturally turned my reflections to what it means if
“There’s no such thing as overtraining, only undersleeping and undereating,” so to speak – and live?
“Is Overtraining Actually Just Undereating? Here’s The Compelling Evidence:”
https://share.google/Rh0pjp3OFfnQknGL0
Supposedly the Buddha said and Jesus subsequently showed us that there’s no such thing as too much suffering, only enough and not enough, much as John Travolta indicated of sugar in the movie “Michael.”
Maybe there’s no such thing as too much “anxiety-depression” or “anxiety/depression” or “ADHD” (a.k.a. impatience) or gambling disorder (a.k.a. bad luck) or any other sin only under training and undereating and undersleeping and under hydrating and underzenning, where to zenn is to
fully accept each moment or
accept each moment be as though you had chosen it +which you may have done, of course) or
try to accept each moment as though you’d chosen it or
try to accept your failure to be able to accept it as though you’d chosen it or
try to start from here-and-now as though there were no other reasonable option or alternative or
try to realize, at least, that no one has always achieved this, yet, and yet that everyone is mad not to, and is “being morally superior to reality,” as Tolle put it, not to…but that we may now all be about to change this, thanks in no small ways to the labors of the likes of Joanna Moncrieff and of Meister Eckhart, the Ephron sisters, John Steinbeck, J.R.R Tolkien and Eckhart Tolle, among countless others.
“The writer is delegated to declare and to celebrate man’s
proven capacity for greatness of heart and spirit — for gallantry in defeat — for courage, compassion and love. In the endless war against weakness and despair, these are the bright rally-flags of hope and of emulation.
I hold that a writer who does not passionately believe in the perfectibility of man, has no dedication nor any membership in literature.” – John Steinbeck.
https://www.reddit.com/r/lotr/s/6msqft2avt
“You do not become good by trying to be good, but by finding the goodness that is already within you, and allowing that goodness to emerge. But it can only emerge if something fundamental changes in your state of consciousness.” –
Eckhart Tolle, “A New Earth: Awakening to Your Life’s Purpose.”
Wishing you Zen, if you wish,
Tom.
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Thank you Dr. Moncrief! If the NYT was in a business other than the anointed stenographer’s of ruling class interests, they’d publish this essential public information.
Given the ubiquity of the neuro-developmental moniker, it’s not lost on me that I haven’t ever seen/heard a single allusion, from the mental health establishment, that the psychiatric drugging of children is a non-negotiable ‘neuro-developmental occurrence’, one where the adverse consequences most often far outweigh the ‘purported’ benefits associated with the respective drugs. Sorry…I just needed to clear up the deliberatively depoliticized aspect of the “neuro-developmental” moniker, with that of its obverse colossally invested “politicized” moniker. To wit:
As someone drugged with Ritalin as a child 60 years ago, I know first hand that the improved focus from Ritalin, is actually a ‘narrowing of the field of focus’, of which can certainly provide someone with a ‘sense of having more attention and focus”, as well as providing observational impressions of someone having improved attention. But I also remember that narrowing of focus was accompanied by a sense of-what I now understand! – a kind of drug induced “docility”. I don’t know what the science stipulates surrounding both of my observations, here? (But I suspect I’ve hit upon something far bigger than my personal experience of Ritalin!). The lager important point is that increasing docility and narrowed focus in children through a pill, makes for a perfect work force and future body of voting citizens-however otherwise despairingly cynical I’ve become.
Yesterday, I watched a YouTube video of a therapist claiming to “have ADHD” and a expert in treating it, all the while making several of the false attributions Dr. Moncrief elucidated throughout this article. The thing is, I don’t believe this therapist was intentionally dishonest. It seems to me, apart from whatever his personal processes, that he’s been educated and trained to believe these ‘neuro-ideological nostrums’. A.N. Whitehead referred to these type of attributional errors as “misplaced concreteness”. What troubles me deeply is that much of our professional managerial class is dangerously deficient in critical thinking abilities, often confusing technological knowledge and professional acumen, for dynamic embodied knowledge. One expansive study suggests that around 8% of college professors, including grad schools-most elite institutions, actually disseminate and command critical thinking within their respective curriculum-despite nearly 100% of the professors believing they do! Too bad there’s not a diagnosis and a pill for critical thinking ‘disorders”; because, to my mind, that would go a long way in creating a healthier sane-society.
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Just a couple clarifications:
I want to correct my above use of the word “occurrence” in conjunction with neuro-developmental. The right word here is “alteration”, of which could also include “rupture”, infliction, stressor, etc. Therefor psychiatric drugs on children are a non-negotiable neurodevelopmental ‘alteration/infliction/rupture/stressor’, etc… not occurrence! Also, instead of referring to the effect of Ritalin as “narrowing the field of attention/focus”, maybe I should have said that Ritalin made my focus “myopic”? The larger point is that Ritalin was a drug that diminished my “healthy divergent thinking mind” (i.e., curious, associative, and creative-and not inattentive!), to a narrowly focused convergent-thinking ‘task oriented” mind. As a kid, prior to Ritalin, I found the questions I couldn’t ask to what was being taught, often far more interesting. Sixty years later I completely understand why! Ritalin changed my curious, wonderment and awe of knowledge, like a hammer to a nail…
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I have deeply mixed feelings about this report, particularly given Peter Fonagy’s theoretical orientation and longstanding investment in Mentalization-Based Treatment (MBT). MBT (“socialize, trust, and things will be okay [oh yeah, and don’t forget to lean heavily into obeying social norms and hierarchies, people are in power over you for a reason]”) may be valuable for some individuals, but it is neither a universal solution to psychological distress nor an adequate response to the current neurodiversity crisis.
The report underestimates the suffering experienced by autistic women without intellectual disabilities, particularly those who remain undiagnosed or receive care through ostensibly progressive “needs-first” frameworks. Without adequate neurodevelopmental assessment and diagnostic recognition, these approaches risk reproducing existing failures: autistic communication differences, emotional distress and responses to chronic environmental mismatch continue to be interpreted through personality-disorder frameworks, particularly EUPD/BPD, even when those labels are no longer explicitly applied. Whether delivered under the banner of “needs-first” care or through an EUPD/BPD formulation in place of an autism diagnosis, inappropriate treatment can perpetuate diagnostic invisibility, retraumatization, functional deterioration and serious safety risks. The overdiagnosis and misdiagnosis of EUPD/BPD in autistic women have been repeatedly raised by advocacy communities. These harms warrant much more direct acknowledgment from established figures in the field, including Fonagy.
The report also presents an idealistic picture of what the NHS can realistically deliver, without sufficiently confronting diagnostic waiting lists, fragmented services and limited specialist capacity. Advocating for individualized, multidisciplinary care is straightforward; explaining how patients will actually access it is considerably harder.
Ultimately, I find the report insufficiently critical of the systems and theoretical frameworks that have contributed to these problems. I question whether Fonagy, like Uta Frith, is sufficiently removed from his own intellectual legacy to produce a genuinely critical policy update. A meaningful shift toward neurodiversity-informed care requires more than repackaging familiar psychological approaches in the language of individual needs. It requires confronting diagnostic overshadowing, acknowledging the iatrogenic consequences of diagnostic refusal and taking seriously the experiences of autistic people who have been profoundly underserved by existing systems.
**TL;DR:** Why is a prominent personality-disorder specialist leading the development of neurodiversity policy? Where is the equally influential neurodevelopmental expert prepared to challenge Fonagy’s theoretical assumptions? A genuinely balanced policy review should include an equal co-author with a substantially different perspective. The absence of that intellectual counterweight raises important questions about whose expertise, assumptions and interests are shaping the future of neurodiversity-informed care. Something doesn’t quite add up.
And perhaps the most disturbing part of this conversation is how easily the suffering of autistic women can be dismissed rather than understood. Instead of recognizing disability, sensory and cognitive overload, chronic environmental mismatch and unmet support needs, women are characterized as “dramatic,” “interpersonally hypersensitive” or psychologically difficult. They are effectively told to regulate themselves, trust others and become more accommodating of circumstances that may be actively harming them. There is something profoundly troubling about a system that repeatedly psychologizes women’s distress while failing to investigate its neurodevelopmental origins.
**How many autistic women have experienced severe deterioration, been retraumatized or even died while their needs were being managed within personality-disorder services rather than appropriately recognized neurodevelopmental care? Where is the systematic accounting of those harms?** That is a question this field should be willing to confront, not avoid while Fonagy hides behind thinly veiled implications the people seeking autism and ADHD evaluations are “just” Cluster B and need to be more chill, like what worked to cure Fonagy’s depression.
Here’s the actual risk of Fonagy’s proposed approach for autistic women: ‘Needs-first’ euphemism in the treatment plan, EUPD/BPD in the breakroom, and autistic women leaving services in even more pain, confusion and self-doubt than when they first asked for help.
Thanks Dr. Fonagy, couldn’t have done it without you!
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